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ABSTRACT: The paper aims to bring together and unify two traditions in studying dialogue as a game: 
dialogical logic introduced by Lorenzen (1978); and persuasion dialogue systems as specified by 
Prakken (2006). We propose a system which allows the elimination of both informal and formal 
fallacies (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004). To this end, we reconstruct dialogical logic in terms of 
speech acts as suggested in (Hodges, 2009). 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The paper aims to bring together and unify two traditions in studying dialogue as a 
game. First tradition was initiated by the dialogical logic introduced by Lorenzen 
(Lorenz & Lorenzen, 1978). This system allows the representation of formal 
dialogues in which the validity of argument is the topic discussed. Persuasion 
dialogue systems as specified by Prakken (2006) represent second tradition which 
focuses on natural dialogues and examines processes typical for real-life 
communication such as e.g. informal fallacies (Hamblin, 1970). 
Studies on a system in which players can not only perform a dialogue 
without fallacies, but also discuss about the formal means of reasoning is important 
for modelling communication. The need of such possibility was introduced in (van 
Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004). According to the rule 6 of the critical discussion 
model, the antagonist may not only challenge the propositional content of premises 
used by the protagonist, but also the justificatory force (i.e., validity) of his 
reasoning. The pragma-dialectical system requires that the protagonist uses rules of 
some logic to defend his reasoning, but it does not provide a formal account of 
dialogues. 
Lorenzen-style dialogue games allow players to check the validity of the 
formulas in a dialogical way. Yet, those games are not designed for modelling real-
life communication, e.g. in the systems for natural dialogues players can use 
different speech acts for making their locutions (e.g. claim, question), while in 
Lonrenzen's game they can only attack and defend formulas (e.g. defend ). This 
does not allow players to verify the validity of the formulas in the style of natural 
dialogues. The solution of this problem is to specify Lorenzen's dialogical logic in 
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terms of speech acts: 
 
Lorenzen claimed that the rules of his games could be justified on a pre-logical basis, 
and so they formed a foundation for logic. Unfortunately any „justification” involves 
a convincing answer to the Dawkins question [i.e. what is the real aim of a game], 
and this Lorenzen never provided. For example he spoke of moves as "attacks", even 
when (...) they look more like help than hostility. To repair Lorenzen's omission, one 
certainly needs to distinguish between different stances that a person might take in 
an argument: stating, assuming, conceding, querying, attacking, committing oneself. 
(...) A more positive view is that this kind of refinement serves to link Lorenzen's 
dialogues to informal logic, and especially to the research that aims to systematise 
the possible structures of sound informal argument. (Hodges, 2009) 
 
In other words, Lorenzen dialogues should be modelled in such a way that players 
could perform not only “technical” moves such as an attack and defence, but also 
moves in which their speech acts are explicitly expressed as e.g. claims or challenges. 
To this end the paper introducing the reconstruction of the dialogical logic 
according to the generic specification for natural dialogues proposed by Prakken 
(2006). 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
 
In this section two models of communication are presented: the dialogical logic for 
formal dialogues introduced by Lorenzen (2.1), and general specification for natural 
dialogue introduced by Prakken (2.2). 
 
2.1 Lorenzen's dialogical logic 
 
Lorenzen's system (Lorenz & Lorenzen, 1978; see also Rahman, 2006) was designed 
to verify the validity of logical formulas by performing a dialogue game. In each 
game two players can participate: proponent P of a formula, and opponent O. During 
the game they can perform two types of moves: attack or defence of a formula. The 
reconstruction proposed in this paper is limited to the rules for verification of 
tautologies of classical propositional logic. 
A dialogue for a formula A, D(A), is a set of dialogue games consisting of 
sequences of moves. Depending on which player makes the move, we talk about P 
statement and O statement, where statement denotes an attack or defence of a 
formula. If there is an exchange of move such that after a player made a 
move and there is no more legal move for player left, then Y loses the 
game. A formula is valid iff P has a winning strategy for . 
Dialogical logic is specified by two types of rules. The structural rules 
determine the general course of the game: 
 
(D00)  P makes the first move, then O and P take turns in performing 
moves, 
(D10)  P may assert an atomic formula only after it has been 
previously asserted by O, 
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(D13)  A P-statement may be attacked at most once, 
(E)  O can react only upon the immediately preceding P-statement. 
 
Second type of rules are particle rules which describe the way a formula can be 
attacked and defended depending on what is its main connective: 
 
   Attacks Defences 
(P1) negation  A  
(P2) conjunction  1? A 
2? B 
(P3) alternative  ? A 
B 
(P4) implication  A B 
Table 1: Particle rules for the basic propositional language 
 
According to the rule (P1), in Table 1 above, in order to attack a negation, a 
player has to assert the negation of the formula, i.e., if X attacks then he says A. 
There is no defences of available. If X attacks he attacks the first or the 
second element of the conjunction, i.e. he asks “1?'” or “2?” (P2). If X defends , 
he asserts the questioned formula making a statement A or a statement B (P2). If X 
attacks , he performs the move “?” which questions the whole disjunction (P3). 
If X defends , he asserts either element of the attacked disjunction (P3). If X 
attacks , he asserts the antecedent, making the statement A (P4). If X defends 
, he asserts the consequent of the attacked implication, making the statement 
B (P4). 
 
2.2 Prakken's general specification for formal dialogue systems 
 
In (Prakken, 2006), Prakken presents a general specification of common elements 
for dialogue systems. The core of those systems consists of three types of rules. The 
locution rules describe what speech acts players can execute during a dialogue: 
 
1. claim φ - the speaker asserts that φ is a case. 
2. concede φ - the speaker admits that φ is a case. 
3. φ since S - the speaker provides the reasons why φ is a case. 
4. retract φ - the speaker declares that he is not committed (any 
more) to φ. 
5. why φ - the speaker challenges that φ is a case ans asks for 
reasons why it would be the case. 
6. question φ - the speaker asks another participant's opinion on 
whether φ is a case. 
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The second type of rules are effect rules which specifies the effects of performing 
each locution on a commitment store of the participant (a commitment of X is a 
sentence that X publicly declared as his belief). For example, when a player 
performs claim φ, he commits to φ, therefore φ is added to his commitment set; 
when a player performs retract φ he declares that he is not committed to φ, 
therefore after this locution φ is deleted from his commitment store. 
The last and the central element of a dialogue system is its protocol which 
determines the interaction between speech acts, i.e. it specifies which locution can 
be performed as a reply to another locution. For example, when a player performs 
why φ, he asks his antagonist to give some reasons that φ is a case, therefore in the 
next move Y can perform argumentative speech ast: φ since S, or declare that he is 
not committed to φ any more by performing retract φ. 
 
3. LOCUTION RULES 
 
In the dialogical logic no locution rules are specified. Players can only attack and 
defend a sentence which has a specific logical connective. Nevertheless, during those 
moves players perform commutative actions such as statement or questioning. This 
is what allows us to describe particle rules in terms of speech acts. 
The procedure of reconstruction of dialogical logic in terms of speech acts is 
showed on an example of reformulation of therule (P3) in which attack and defence 
of disjunction are described (the full reconstruction is described in my MA thesis: 
Yaskorska, 2012 (in Polish)). According to the rule (P3) a player can attack a 
disjunction by performing a question about this formula. In Prakken's general 
specification, two locutions can be used for raising questions: question and why . 
Yet, according to the rule (P3), a player defends a disjunction by stating the 
truth of its element what can be interpreted as a speech act of argumentation, in 
which a player gives a reason why a disjunctive sentence is the case by stating its 
disjunct. In the language of the general specification, such an action can be modelled 
by a speech act: since , where is a disjunction, and is a sentence A or sentence 
B. Consequently, if we model a defence of disjunction in (P3) as an argumentation 
act, we should model its attack in (P3) as a challenge, i.e. by a speech act why . 
 As a result of such a reconstruction procedure, actions which players 
perform during attacks and defences can be modelled as the following locution rules: 
 
L1  Claim claim is performed when a player: 
(1) attacks , then is a formula , 
(2) defends , then is a formula or a formula , 
(3) attacks , then is a formula , 
(4) defends , then is a formula ; 
L2  Concession concede is performed when is an atomic 
formula and P is a player: 
(1)  attacks , then is a formula , 
(2)  defends , then is a formula or a formula , 
 (3)  attacks , then is a formula , 
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(4)  defends , then is a formula ; 
L3  Argumentation since is performed when a player defends 
, then is a formula and is a set which includes the 
formula or the formula ; 
L4  Challenge why is performed when a player attacks , then 
is a formula ; 
L5  Question question is performed when a player attacks , 
then is a formula or a formula . 
 
4. EFFECT RULES 
 
In the original description of the dialogical logic no commitment stores of the 
players are defined, therefore no effect rules for this system are also specified. The 
specificity of this system forces different uses of this set, e.g. in a certain situations a 
player has to commit to contradictory formulas and according to the rules of 
dialogical logic he also cannot retract his commitments. As a result a player can have 
contradictory commitments, which he cannot change. 
 In the new account of dialogical logic, we introduce the notion of hypothetical 
commitment store in order to show the dynamics of participants' commitments 
during the game. Such specification would describe the main idea of formal 
dialogues (see: Hodges, 2009). During those dialogues players do not discuss about 
the facts but verify the validity of the formula by assuming or challenging sentences 
of which a thesis consist. 
 In the reconstruction of dialogical logic effect rules are modelled using 
locution rules (L1)-(L5) and the description of effect rules used in Prakken's 
language. For a formal dialogue D'(A), the rules for hypothetical commitment base 
C's of a player are specified below, where s(m) denotes a move of a player s 
and φ,ψ are propositional formulas: 
 
(E1)  If = claim , then = ; 
(E2)  If = concede , then = ; 
(E3)  If = since , then ; 
(E4)  If = why , then = ; 
(E5)  If = question , then = . 
 
5. PROTOCOL 
 
After describing speech acts and commitment store which players can use during 
the Lorenzen's dialogue game, we can model a protocol. In the dialogical logic a 
player attacks and defends formulas which can have a form of negation, conjunction, 
disjunction, and conditional. Particle rules specify how a player can make such 
moves and structural rules specify the general order of making those moves. Using 
these two types of rules of original dialogical logic as well as the locution rules 
specified in the new account we can describe all possible moves which can be 
performed after each move during the game. 
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 In this section we present an example of such a reconstruction procedure 
and rules of protocol obtained as a result of the reconstruction. The full description 
of protocol is presented in (Yaskorska, et al. 2012). Let's take a closer look on how a 
player can respond to the attack and defence of the disjunction. According to the 
rule (PR3) a player can attack a disjunction by challenging it, i.e. asking for its 
justification. This move is modelled by the speech act of challenge: why , where is 
a sentence . His antagonist can respond to this move by defending the 
disjunction what is modelled by argumentative act: since , where is a 
disjunction and is a sentence A or sentence B. 
 On the other hand, responses to the defence of the disjunction could be 
modelled in the following way. Suppose that P defences a disjunction using the 
speech act since . Then, next moves of opponent depends on the structure of . If 
is a negation, e.g. , then, according to the particle rule (P1), he can attack this 
negation by stating the fruth of . If a formula is a conjunctio, e.g. , then 
opponent can attack this conjunction by performing question , where is a formula 
or a formula (P2). If a sentence is a disjunction, e.g. , then opponent can 
attack it by performing why . If a sentence is an implication, e.g. , then a 
player can attack it by performing claim , where formula is a sentence (P4). 
 In the reconstruction of protocol we must also take into account structural 
rules of dialogical logic according to which proponent cannot introduce an atomic 
formula (D10). Consequently, we need to add a rule which describes in which cases 
proponent can use a proposition. After reconstruction, the procedure of which is 
presented above, structural rule (D10) and particle rule (P2) can be implemented 
via following rules: 
 
(1)  A player P cannot perform claim where is a proposition; he can 
state that is true executing concede but this move can be 
performed only if O claimed in some previous move; 
(2)  After claim a player can perform: 
1.  claim , if is a negation of the formula and is a contradiction to , 
(P has to follow the restriction described in (1)), 
2.  concede , if P is a player and is a proposition, and is a negation of 
the formula and is a contradiction to , 
3.  question , if is a conjunction and is one of its operands, why , if 
is a disjunction; 
(3) After why a player can perform: 
 1.  since (P has to follow the restriction described in (1)). 
 
6. RIGOROUS PERSUASIVE DIALOGUE (RPD) 
 
In this section the new account of dialogical logic is compared with the system RPD 
(Rigorous Persuasive Dialogue) introduced by Walton & Krabbe (1995). Let's look at 
a sample game during which the validity of the formula is 
investigated. 
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O P 
                                (0) 
(1)                            0 1         1?                                               (2) 
(3)                                     2 3          ?                                                 (4) 
(5)         q                                         4 1         q                                                 (6) 
Table 2: Example 1 
 
 In this example, proponent P in move (0) states the formula, which is the 
topic of the discussion. The main connective of the formula is an implication, so 
opponent O in (2) attacks this formula by stating its antecedent (P4). According to 
(D10), proponent cannot defend attacked formula by asserting its consequent, 
because it is an atomic formula, therefore he attacks opponent's assertion which is a 
conjunction by asking about the truth of its first element (P2). In (4) opponent 
defends this conjunction by asserting the truth of the questioned sentence. In (5) 
proponent attacks the sentence uttered by opponent in the third move. This time a 
disjunction is a main connective, so proponent challenges the whole sentence (P3). 
Opponent defends this disjunction by stating the truth of its element, i.e. the 
sentence q. Using the rule (D10) proponent repeats this statement and defends the 
main formula (P4). Opponent does not have any legal move, which means that 
proponent wins and formula is a tautology. 
 Let's consider now how this game can be modelled in the LND system which 
is based on the reconstruction proposed in this paper (the full description of LND 
system is introduced in (Yaskorska et al., 2013)). 
 
P1:  InitLor  
O2:  claim      
P3:  question     
O4:  claim    
P5:  why ? 
O6:  since q 
P7:  concede q 
O8:  EndLor     
 
 In this dialogue the first move begins with proponent's locution InitLor 
, which starts dialogue game about formula (see 
Yaskorska et al. 2013). Next the game is performed as it was presented in Table 2 
using speech acts defined in the reconstruction. For example, according to the 
protocol rule (2.3) (see section 5), after move O2, which is claim 
proponent performs claim in order to attack opponent’s 
utterance. O ends the game via locution EndLor , which according 
to the rules of LND system means that he loses the game and the main formula is a 
tautology. 
 The same dialogue can be modelled according to the rules of RPD dialogue 
game (Walton & Krabbe, 1995) as follows: 
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Concessions: (1)  
(2)  
Thesis:           q 
1. O: ??   
2. P:  ? (concess. (1)) 
3. O: q 
4. P: !  
  
First, the preliminary situation of the dialogue is described by listing 
opponent's concessions and the thesis of the game stated by the proponent. In the 
first move  of the game opponent attacks the thesis of the dialogue by challenging it. 
According to the rules of RPD game, proponent can not respond to this challenge, so 
he uses an option of free-question and attacks first concession. The main connective 
of attacked formula is disjunction, so according to the RPD logical rules opponent 
asserts one of it's element, i.e. states q. In the fourth move proponent performs 
speech act You said so yourself (!), which is a final remark indicating the end of the 
dialogue game. 
 The first difference between LND and RPD systems can be described by the 
uses of locution rules, i.e. in both systems locution rules are described in a different 
way: in LND moves are based on illocutionary force of the speech act. In the RPD 
approach players utter only contents of the locution. For example, in the LND 
dialogue in P5 in order to attack a disjunction proponent uses speech act why 
and in the move opponent uses an argumentative act to defend it. In the PPD 
dialogue players during the attack and defence of disjunction in the second and 
third perform a content of the speech acts. 
 The second difference concerns the definition of players' commitment stores. 
In LND players use the hypothetical commitment store, when in RPD players have at 
their disposal two types of store: for concessions and potential defences of the 
player. In both systems these elements play a different role. For example, during the 
O6 sentence q is added to the C' which means that O is hypothetically committed to 
this sentence. In the RPD dialogue after the third move sentence q is added to the 
concessions of the opponent and his set of potential defences is empty. 
 Protocols in the two systems differ in a way that the games are described. In 
LND the protocol describes the interaction between locutions, while in RPD between 
propositional contents. For example, in LND dialogue move O6 is made on base of 
the protocol rule, which describes the order in which speech acts can be performed. 
In the RPD dialogue opponents reply on the attack made by proponent in the second 
move bases on logical move, which illustrate particle rules of dialogical logic. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
In the paper we present a description of Lorenzen's dialogical logic in terms of 
speech acts. Reconstructed dialogical logic is specified using three types of rules: 
locution rules which describes the speech acts a player can perform during the 
dialogue; effect rules which describes what effect the performance of certain speech 
act has on speaker's commitment store; and protocol which describes which speech 
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act a player can perform during the certain stage of the game. 
 The reconstruction of dialogical logic was extended to include branching 
rules, and the protocol of LND (Lorenzen Natural Dialogue) system was introduced 
in (Yaskorska et al., 2013). Next, the LND system was combined with similar 
reconstruction of Hamblin's formal dialectic (Hamblin, 1970) and a dialogue system 
for modelling communication in which formal fallacies can be identified was 
introduced in (Kacprzak & Yaskorska, 2013). 
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